Interbank lending and monetary policy transmission: evidence for Germany by Ehrmann, Michael & Worms, Andreas
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Ehrmann, Michael; Worms, Andreas
Working Paper
Interbank lending and monetary policy
transmission: evidence for Germany
Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen
Bundesbank, No. 2001,11
Provided in cooperation with:
Deutsche Bundesbank, Forschungszentrum
Suggested citation: Ehrmann, Michael; Worms, Andreas (2001) : Interbank lending
and monetary policy transmission: evidence for Germany, Discussion paper Series 1 /









of the Deutsche Bundesbank
July 2001
The discussion papers published in this series represent
the authors’ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Deutsche Bundesbank or the European Central Bank.Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main,
P.O.B.  10 06 02, 60006 Frankfurt am Main, Federal Republic of Germany
Telephone  (0 69) 95 66-1
Telex within Germany  4 1 227, telex from abroad  4 14 431, fax  (0 69) 5 60 10 71
Internet: http://www.bundesbank.de
Please address all orders in writing to: Deutsche Bundesbank,
Press and Public Relations Division, at the above address, or by fax No. (0 69) 95 66-30 77
Reproduction permitted only if source is stated.
ISBN  3–933747–79–1Abstract
This paper presents empirical evidence on the behaviour of interbank lending in Germany
after a monetary policy impulse. Our VAR analysis shows that following a monetary contrac-
tion, the banking system as a whole attracts additional funds from foreign banks. Whereas
small cooperative and savings banks do not seem to directly access the interbank market
themselves, they do so indirectly through the head institutions of their sectors, i.e. the savings
banks‘ and credit cooperative sector, respectively. The interbank flows within these two sec-
tors allow small banks to access funds that might help them in keeping their loan portfolio
relatively unaffected. This may explain why the evidence for a bank lending channel in Ger-
many seems to be weaker compared to other countries, e.g. the US.
JEL classification: C32, E52, G21
keywords: monetary policy, bank lending channel, interbank marketZusammenfassung
Dieses Papier präsentiert empirische Evidenz zum Verhalten der Interbankkredite in
Deutschland nach einem geldpolitischen Impuls. Unsere VAR-Analyse zeigt, dass das Ban-
kensystem als Ganzes nach einer geldpolitischen Kontraktion zusätzliche Mittel von Banken
aus dem Ausland aufnimmt. Während kleine Kreditgenossenschaften und Sparkassen nicht
direkt auf den Interbankenmarkt zugreifen, tun sie dies indirekt durch die übergeordneten In-
stitute ihres jeweiligen Girosystems, d.h. des Genossenschafts- bzw. Sparkassensektors. Die
Interbankströme innerhalb dieser beiden Sektoren erlauben es auf diese Weise kleinen Banken
an Mittel zu gelangen, mit deren Hilfe sie die Wirkungen geldpolitischer Maßnahmen auf ihr
Kreditportefeuille abfedern können. Dies könnte auch erklären, warum die Evidenz für einen
Bankkreditkanal in Deutschland schwächer zu sein scheint als in anderen Ländern, beispiels-
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Interbank lending and monetary policy transmission:
evidence for Germany*
1 Introduction
Of the various channels transmitting monetary policy,
1 the “credit channel” received major
attention in recent research. It is built on the primary insight that financial markets are char-
acterised by an asymmetric distribution of information among the market participants. If in
such an environment monetary policy is able to alter the supply of external finance, its effects
are unevenly distributed across economic agents: The more severe the informational asym-
metry, the more difficult it should be for firms and households to switch between external and
internal finance and the more strongly should their spending behaviour be affected.
Within this credit channel theory, the “bank lending channel” concentrates on a specific
type of external finance, namely on bank loans. Given that banks are a device to deal with the
informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers,
2 bank loans are not perfectly sub-
stitutable by other forms of external finance, at least for some borrowers. If therefore banks
react to restrictive monetary policy impulses by reducing their loan supply, especially those
firms and households should be affected that have to rely on bank loans. This is in contrast
with the traditional interest rate channel of monetary transmission, which derives effects of
monetary policy through interest rate effects on loan demand rather than on loan supply.
Both firm and bank data have frequently been used to test for the existence of a bank
lending channel.
3 To identify loan demand (which should decrease following a monetary
tightening according to the interest rate channel) from loan supply (which is the transmitter in
the bank lending channel), size was usually the discriminatory device.
4 It has been argued that
asymmetric information problems are more severe for small firms and banks. As a conse-
quence, they should experience higher financing costs and/or a stronger decrease in the avail-
ability of funds after a monetary tightening. For the case of banks, this means that small banks
should show a larger decline in their lending to non-banks. For the US, the evidence is fairly
                                                                
* We would like to thank an anonymous referee, Hans Bauer, Heinz Herrmann, Michael Scharnagl, Christian Upper and Raf
Wouters for comments on earlier drafts, seminar participants of the Bundesbank, CFS and the ECB for further suggestions,
and Anders Warne and Henrik Hansen for sharing their computer code.
1 For an overview of the different transmission channels see e.g. Cecchetti, S. (1995) and Mishkin, F.S. (1996).
2 For an overview of different theories on financial intermediation see e.g. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) or Kashyap et al.
(1999).
3 For studies using firm data see e.g. Christiano et al. (1996), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) for the US; for the euro area, Mo-
jon (2000) provides an extensive overview of the available evidence; for Germany, see e.g. Ehrmann (2000).– 2 –
supportive for this transmission channel.
5 Therefore, this size-related idea to identify loan
supply movements has been applied to other countries, too.
For Germany, only very few such studies were conducted with bank data up to now, which
is mainly due to the restricted data availability. Based on BankScope, a dataset covering a
sample of (among others) German banks, DeBondt (2000) finds evidence for the reaction of
bank lending to monetary policy to be dependent on bank size in a panel econometric analy-
sis. On the other hand, Favero et al. (1999) do not find such evidence using the same database
in a cross-sectional analysis. Ehrmann et al. (2001) – testing for a differential reaction of bank
loans to monetary policy across banks for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the euro-area as
a whole – do not find evidence for a bank lending channel based on bank size as the discrimi-
nating variable. They also show that BankScope is not necessarily a useful database for exer-
cises of this kind. Worms (2001) – using the Bundesbank´s bank balance sheet statistics cov-
ering all German banks – cannot reject the hypothesis that the reaction of a bank´s lending to
monetary policy depends on its size, although this effect does not seem to be of macroeco-
nomic importance.
In this paper, we will argue that a study of the bank lending channel in Germany has to
consider the peculiarities of the German banking system. Several features might be consid-
ered in this respect. For example, the Bundesbank deals with a larger share of banks as coun-
terparties than the Federal Reserve.
6 This indicates that it is much easier for small banks to
access central bank money. Furthermore, the cooperative banks´ sector - to which the lion´s
share of small banks belongs - as well as the savings banks´ sector operate funds backed up
by mutual guarantees, which serve to recapitalise the respective member institutions or to
satisfy the creditors in the case of insolvency. Therefore, even if size were a good proxy for
informational asymmetries, those informational problems could well be without immediate
consequences for the lending behaviour of banks, rendering size an inadequate variable to
identify loan supply and thereby the bank lending channel.
Furthermore, it has often been argued that the German banking system, characterised to a
large extent by relationship lending, weakens the case for the bank lending channel. The
German system of “Hausbanken”
7, along this line of reasoning, tends to shelter borrowers
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
4 Some papers also concentrated on the degree of liquidity (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein (2000)) and on capitalisation (see e.g.
Peek and Rosengren (1995)).
5 See, e.g., Kashyap et al. (1993), Kashyap and Stein (2000).
6 See Borio (1997), p. 49 and 71.
7 See, e.g., Elsas and Krahnen (1998).– 3 –
from the short-term effects of a restrictive monetary policy. Although this might be the case,
it is unclear how German banks are able to perform this task given that restrictive monetary
policy leads to a drain of (or to a rise in the price for) reserves. This is especially relevant in
the case of the small, local banks because they usually are assumed to entertain these close
“Hausbank” relationships to their customers. Keeping up the lending relationships could
prove to be difficult if they are affected disproportionately strongly from the drain of funds
following a monetary contraction.
We will argue that the structure of the German banking system offers the potential to
counteract the distributional effects of the bank lending channel. The German interbank mar-
ket is structured in a way that enables most small banks to attract funds through large banks.
Using grouped monthly balance sheet data on all German banks, we show that small banks
can alleviate the disproportionate drain of funds on the interbank market. This effect can ex-
plain why it has been difficult to detect bank lending channel effects in Germany using bank
size as the sole device for identification.
8
In the remainder of the paper, we will first introduce the dataset underlying our analysis
and provide a description of the German interbank market, highlighting the characteristics
that give rise to our presumption. Section 3 then describes how we organise the data for the
empirical analysis. The subsequent section 4 analyses the reaction of bank loans to non-banks
to a restrictive monetary policy shock, where we use the traditional bank size criterion as the
discriminatory device. In a very simple setting that does not use bank-size related control
variables for loan demand, we find that small banks do not seem to decrease their lending by
more than large banks do. Instead, rather the opposite seems to be the case. Therefore, in sec-
tion 5 we go on to investigate the interbank flows that follow a restrictive monetary policy
impulse, testing our presumption that small banks can indirectly access additional interbank
funds. We find that the bulk of small banks, namely those that are part of the savings banks‘
or the credit cooperative sector, is supplied with funds from the head institutions of their re-
spective sector. By removing all banks that are organised in such a sector from our database
and subsequently re-running the simple estimations from section 4, we are able to show in
section 6 that for the remaining banks size matters for the reaction of their loans to non-banks
                                                                
8 Pill (1997) argues similarly that in a small open economy size in itself might not be a good proxy for tests of the bank len-
ding channel. He finds that monetary policy tightenings in Spain are tempered by the ability of banks to borrow abroad. Also,
Angeloni et al. (1995) show that the institutional features of national banking systems need to be taken into account for stu-
dies of the bank lending channel. They show that, in Italy, large banks increase the interest rates on loans by more than small
banks do, a feature related to the existence of customer relationships.– 4 –
to monetary policy shocks, as predicted by the bank lending channel theory. Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 The database and the structure of the German interbank market
The data used in this analysis was taken from the balance sheet statistics of the Deutsche
Bundesbank. It comprises individual bank balance sheet data of all German banks for the pe-
riod 1992-1998 on a monthly basis. The period after 1998 was not used in this study because
harmonisation procedures in the uprun to EMU led to a break in the data definitions. The data
on interbank assets and liabilities is disaggregated into several maturity categories and con-
tains information on the respective counterparties.
Table 1: Structure of interbank assets and liabilities by bank category
a
% of total interbank assets or liabilities, respectively
interbank assets/interbank liabilities vis-à-vis















...assets 72.0 n.a. 26.6 1.5 0.0 savings
banks ...liabilities 55.6 n.a. 34.1 0.2 10.1





c ...liabilities n.a. 13.1 61.0 15.8 10.1
...assets 92.3 n.a. 7.3 0.4 0.0 cooperative
banks ...liabilities 80.6 n.a. 15.8 1.9 1.8






tutions ...liabilities n.a. 54.8 33.9 4.5 6.9
...assets 0.0 0.0 69.9 30.1 0.0
“other” banks ...liabilities 0.0 0.0 64.8 29.2 6.0
a average of the bank-individual ratios over all banks in a category and over all available months.
b including mortgage banks.
c including DGZ Dekabank Deutsche Kommunalbank.
Table 1 contains information on the interbank linkages of the various bank groups. The
savings banks hold almost three quarters of their interbank assets vis-à-vis their head institu-
tions (in the case of the credit cooperatives this share stands even higher, at 92%). It can also
be seen that the savings banks and the credit cooperatives hold only a relatively small share of
their interbank assets vis-à-vis banks that are not part of their respective sector (foreign banks
and “other” domestic banks). Contrary to this, the head institutions of the two sectors hold
about 54% (savings banks´ sector) and about 42% (cooperative sector) vis-à-vis “other” do-
mestic banks. The largest share of interbank assets vis-à-vis foreign banks is held by the
“other” domestic banks, highlighting their close relationships with banks abroad.– 5 –
This picture does not change considerably when interbank liabilities are considered. Table
1 therefore leads to the notion, that the “other” domestic banks have close linkages with for-
eign banks, whereas the head institutions of the two bank sectors have close relationships with
the lower level institutions of their respective system and with the “other” domestic banks.
While the head institutions of the savings banks´ sector do have considerable relationships
with foreign banks, the linkages between the cooperative central banks and foreign banks
seem to be much weaker. Savings banks and cooperative banks have close relationships al-
most exclusively with the head institutions of their respective sector.
Figure 1: Stylised description of the German interbank market
This leads us to the stylised description of the German interbank market depicted in figure
1:
9 We identify two segments of the German interbank market, the external (see upper part of
figure 1) and the internal interbank market (see lower part). The internal interbank market
denotes the linkages within the two bank sectors, the cooperative sector and the savings
banks´ sector. The cooperative banks as well as the savings banks maintain their main lending
relationships with their respective head institutions. Almost no lending takes place between
the single member banks within the two sectors. It is the head institutions (the Landesbanken
for the savings banks and the cooperative central banks for the credit cooperatives) which
establish the link to the external domestic interbank market for their whole sector. This exter-
nal interbank market, in turn, is characterised by multiple lending relationships between all
participating banks. It is only the external interbank market that has a non-negligible connec-
tion with foreign banks (as will be shown in table 2).
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The fact that most small and medium-sized banks are organised within one of the two bank
sectors with internal interbank markets (see below) casts doubt on the presumption that large
and small banks face a different reaction of their access to funding in case of restrictive
monetary policy actions. It can at least not be ruled out a priori that in case of a restrictive
monetary policy measure the head institutions of the two bank sectors channel funds to their
affiliated small institutions, thus counteracting potential funding problems otherwise faced by
these small institutions. In this case, the situation of a small bank following a monetary con-
traction does not necessarily depend on its size, but rather on its head institutions’ availability
of funds and on how the funds are allocated within the respective sector.
3 Definition of bank size classes and construction of grouped data
In order to test the hypothesis that the reaction of a bank´s interbank borrowing and lend-
ing to monetary policy depends on its size, the banks are classified into three size classes.
Banks are denoted “small” if at a given point in time their sum of total assets is less than the
75-percentile of the distribution of total assets over all banks. A bank is denoted “large” if its
total assets are equal to or larger than the 95-percentile. All other banks have “medium size”
by definition. Table 2 entails information on the relative importance of these three size groups
for June 1995, the middle of our sample period, but the following qualitative remarks on the
structure of the German banking system hold for all other periods as well.
3.1 Descriptive evidence on the size structure of the German banking system
The group of small banks contains only credit cooperatives (88%), savings banks and
“other” banks. The four cooperative central banks and 13 head institutions of the savings
banks´ sector all belong to the group of large banks. In this group, only 0.4% of the coopera-
tive banks could be found. The lion share of all savings banks can be found in the group of
medium-sized banks.
Table 2 shows furthermore that there is a glaring heterogeneity with respect to the size of
the banks in terms of their share in total assets: While the small banks – by definition 75% of
all banks – hold only about 8% of total assets, the 5% largest banks hold almost three quarters
of total assets. This heterogeneity – although not that extreme – exists also in terms of the
share in total loans to non-banks: 2420 small credit cooperatives hold about 8% of these
loans, whereas 89 large “other” banks hold more than 45%.– 7 –
The 17 head institutions of the two bank sectors hold about one third of all (gross) domes-
tic interbank assets and liabilities, the “other” banks almost half of the interbank assets and
about 40% of the interbank liabilities. Due to the fact that these banks belong to the group of
large banks, this group holds 86% of all domestic interbank assets and 79% of all domestic
interbank liabilities. This indicates, that the head institutions of the two sectors play an out-
standing role in the German interbank market.

















small 2748 8.4 9.2 5.2 5.4 1.5 2.1
of which: savings banks 139 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0
Landesbanken 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
credit cooperatives 2420 6.8 7.7 4.2 3.9 0.0 0.2
coop. central banks 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
other banks 189 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.8
medium 733 17.5 18.9 9.1 15.6 7.5 9.8
of which: savings banks 420 10.8 12.1 4.0 9.1 0.1 0.1
Landesbanken 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
credit cooperatives 200 3.9 4.4 2.6 1.9 0.1 0.2
coop. central banks 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
other banks 113 2.8 2.4 2.5 4.6 7.3 9.6
large 184 74.1 71.9 85.6 79.0 91.0 88.1
of which: savings banks 68 8.4 9.8 3.4 6.8 0.6 0.2
Landesbanken 13 17.7 14.1 28.0 25.2 24.7 20.8
credit cooperatives 10 1.0 1.1 1.3 0.6 0.3 0.0
coop. central banks 4 3.1 1.0 8.3 10.7 3.2 1.8
other banks 89 43.9 45.9 44.6 35.7 62.1 65.2
all banks 3665 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which: savings banks 627 20.1 22.9 7.7 16.6 0.7 0.3
Landesbanken 13 17.7 14.1 28.0 25.2 24.7 20.8
credit cooperatives 2630 11.7 13.2 8.1 6.4 0.4 0.4
coop. central banks 4 3.1 1.1 8.3 10.7 3.2 1.8
other banks 391 47.4 48.8 47.8 41.1 70.9 76.6
Table 2 also shows that about 90% of (gross) foreign interbank liabilities and assets are
held by the group of large banks. The share of foreign interbank assets and liabilities held by
savings banks and the cooperative sector as a whole is negligible, so that about 95% are held
solely by the Landesbanken and the group of “other” banks. This confirms the description in
the last section: It is mainly the group of large banks (and there almost exclusively the Lan-
desbanken and the ”other” banks) that have lending and borrowing relationships to foreign
banks.
3.2 Construction of grouped time series
The grouped time series are constructed as follows: In a first step, for every single period t,
every bank is categorised as being small, medium or large. In a second step, the individual– 8 –
asset and liability positions are added up groupwise for every period (methodology (1)). This
allows banks to change the size group from period to period.
10 Therefore, changes in the ag-
gregated asset and liability positions of the groups can in principle be caused by two factors:
Changes in the composition of the groups or changes in the underlying bank individual asset
and liability positions. In order to generate series that are not affected by compositional
changes, an additional methodology is applied (methodology (2)). For every period t, we as-
sign each bank to one of the three size groups, both for the current and the previous period t-1
separately. All banks that are not in the same group for both these periods t and t-1 are not
taken into account (for the calculation referring to period t only). This creates size groups that
contain the same banks in t and in t-1. Then, the individual asset and liability positions of the
remaining banks are added up groupwise, for t and t-1. Subsequently, period-to-period growth
rates of the respective positions are calculated on the basis of this groupwise aggregated data,
leading to a time series of consistent growth rates. In the last step, these growth rates are used
to construct a time series of volumes by multiplying the (cumulated) growth rates with the
respective starting value in January 1992.
Methodology (2) creates time series of grouped asset and liability volumes that change
only due to movements in the underlying individual balance sheet positions. Since both meth-
odologies have their specific drawbacks – (1) is sensitive to compositional changes, (2) does
not necessarily contain the “true” value of the balance sheet positions of the group at hand –
we perform the econometric analysis for both types of grouped data. Furthermore, the data
generated by methodology (1) is used in levels (measured in 1000 DM) and alternatively in
ratios, i.e. as shares of total assets. Here, we take account of the type of position we look at,
when determining the denominator: if the numerator is a net position, e.g. interbank assets net
of a specific interbank liability position, then the denominator is the comparable net position,
e.g. total asset net of this specific interbank liability position.
Figure A1 shows the time series of the net interbank positions calculated with methodol-
ogy (1). The upper panel represents the overall interbank position of small, medium-sized and
large banks. The series in the second panel report the positions of banks on the “external”
interbank market, i.e. those positions that are not held within the savings banks and the coop-
                                                                
10 On average, about 19 banks move from one size group into another group in every month. This is mainly due to changes in
the threshold values caused by the reduction in the population and to a small extent by extraordinary increases in the size of
single banks caused by mergers. On average, about 12 group switches per month could be explained by these two factors,
leaving only about 7 changes that are due to a comparatively strong or weak change in total assets. This corresponds to only– 9 –
erative sector. Those intra-sectoral balances are shown in the third panel. Finally, the fourth
panel contains the positions of German banks abroad. A further disaggregation shows that the
trending behaviour of many of those series is mainly caused by long-term positions, whereas
most of the variability arises in the short maturities of up to three months.
4 Monetary policy and bank loans to non-banks
In order to analyse the effects of monetary policy on bank loans and later on the interbank
market, we employ Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVAR). In particular, we use the
identification scheme proposed by King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991), since this strategy
allows us to explicitly take potential nonstationarities of our time series into account. A de-
tailed discussion of both SVAR models and the identification procedure followed here is pro-
vided in the appendix.
Our initial model consists of a four-variate VAR with  ]' [ t t t t t l y r X π = , where  t r
stands for a nominal interest rate,  t π  for inflation,  t y  for real output and  t l  for the real vol-
ume of bank loans to non-banks. Since the interest rate serves as the indicator for the stance of
monetary policy, we use the three months money market rate. Inflation and output are impor-
tant factors in any central bank’s reaction function, so it is crucial to include these variables in
our system. For a measure of inflation, we opted for producer price inflation rather than con-
sumer prices, since for the sample period under consideration, consumer prices are very much
distorted by indirect tax increases and one-off effects of German unification. The choice of
industrial production as the output variable arises naturally, because we want to keep the
monthly frequency of the bank balance sheet database.
11 VARs consisting of an interest rate,
inflation and output became a sort of standard or basic framework for empirical monetary
policy analysis within the last years. In order to test our hypothesis, which relates to the bank
lending channel, we have to enhance this basic framework with a loan variable.
12 We fur-
thermore include seasonal dummies and a linear trend (which is restricted to lie in the cointe-
grating space in order to avoid a quadratic trend in the level of the variables). The lag length
of our models is chosen such that autoregressive error terms are avoided, which is accom-
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
0.2% of the respective population of banks, which should be negligible. We can therefore rule out the possibility that compo-
sitional changes of the groups are endogenous, i.e. caused by monetary policy.
11 In Germany, industrial production approximates GDP fairly well, unlike, e.g., in the US.
12 The loan aggregate we use here is fairly broad. It includes loans to government and to private non-banks, and covers mort-
gage loans as well as all other loan types. Repeating the analysis with a more homogeneous loan (but smaller) aggregate, i.e.– 10 –
plished by the inclusion of four lags. All models are estimated as Vector Error Correction
Models (VECM) in order to allow for cointegration relations between the variables.
As a matter of fact, the cointegration analysis suggests the existence of three cointegration
relations (see table A1 in the appendix). A natural candidate for one of these equilibrium rela-
tionships is some kind of central bank reaction function. We expect that the Bundesbank,
when setting interest rates, took into account inflation and the output gap.
13 For the sample
period under study, it happens to be that output is not subject to a trend. Therefore, measuring
the output gap as the deviation of industrial production from trend coincides with the original
output variable. Another equilibrium relationship often found in empirical studies is the sta-
tionarity of the real interest rate. For the third cointegrating vector, we will test whether bank
loans to non-banks lt are cointegrating with interest rates.
The cointegrating vectors are therefore estimated as
t r t π t y t l t






























It can be seen that the coefficient on inflation in the monetary policy reaction function is
slightly larger than one, as would be adequate in a Taylor-rule framework. The stationarity of
real interest rates can be improved by adding a linear trend for this sample period. Bank loans
depend negatively on the level of interest rates, which is compatible with both, the bank
lending channel and the interest rate channel. The overidentifying restrictions cannot be re-
jected by a 
2 χ -test (see table A2 in the appendix).
The sample period under inspection is characterised by a trending behaviour of several va-
riables, related to the uprun to EMU and the consequences of German unification, which is
reflected also in the real interest rates. This is due to the fact that we have data available only
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
loans to private firms only, does not produce qualitatively different results. Due to the fact that the broader aggregate is of
higher macroeconomic importance, we decided to present the results based on this loan variable.
13 This is compatible with assuming that the Bundesbank followed an intermediate monetary target when setting interest
rates. See e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank (1999), esp. p. 53.– 11 –
for a short sample period.
14 Over a longer sample, real interest rates have been found to be
stationary without the inclusion of a trend.
15 Due to the fact that including a trend into the real
interest rate cointegration equation is somewhat unappealing from a theoretical point of view,
we carried out a sensitivity analysis (see appendix A4). It shows that the inclusion of the line-
ar trend improves the tests on the overidentifying restrictions substantially, but does not affect
the qualitative results of the impulse response analysis.
To proceed with the impulse response analysis, it is necessary to identify the monetary
policy shock. The first identification restriction we impose is to assume that the shock is tran-
sitory, because after some time all variables should return to baseline. Additionally, we im-
pose the fairly standard assumption that it affects neither inflation nor output within the same
month.
The impulse responses are depicted in the first four graphs of figure A2. All responses are
presented with 90% error bounds. It can be seen that a contractionary monetary policy shock
leads to a temporary decrease in inflation and output, and that it decreases bank lending sig-
nificantly. These results are in line with conventional theory. However, the impulse responses
show a brief price puzzle
16 and a surprising initial response of output. Since both of them dis-
appear in the subsequent estimates, we decided not to elaborate on the model at this stage.
Both effects do not affect our qualitative results that are based on extended versions of this
baseline model.
To see whether the size of banks affects the response of loans to a restrictive monetary
policy shock, we re-estimate this model for the group of small and large banks separately.
17
The bank lending channel predicts that small banks’ loan supply to non-banks should decline
by more than that of large banks does. This differential reaction is used as an identification
device to separate loan supply from loan demand reactions. Assuming that the loan demand
responds in the same way for all banks, regardless of their size, a different reaction in bank
lending for banks of different size identifies a reaction of loan supply. However, as can be
seen in the last two graphs of figure A2 (see appendix), this cannot be found in our experi-
ment: Most of the overall reduction in bank loans seems to be borne by large banks, with
small banks showing no significant response at all. This is compatible with the notion that
                                                                
14 The short sample also precludes tests for the stability of the empirical results.
15 See Ehrmann (2000).
16 This is often found for post-unification Germany. See, e.g., Peersman and Smets (2000).
17 For the results of the cointegration analysis, see the second and third columns of tables A1 and A2.– 12 –
small banks are to some extent insulating their loan customers from monetary policy induced
increases in interest rates, which is in line with the relationship banking assumption often met
in the case of Germany. To use the size of banks to identify loan supply from loan demand is
therefore not suitable for the German case. This implies that the third cointegrating vector can
represent either a supply or a demand reaction.
Notwithstanding this identification issue, it remains to be seen how the small banks man-
age to insulate their lending from monetary policy impulses, because after a restrictive mone-
tary policy shock they should be in need for additional funds in order to be able to do so. The
underlying assumption of bank lending channel theories, namely that small banks find it more
difficult than large banks to finance their lending following an interest rate increase, does not
seem to hold in the German case. There must be a mechanism at work, which enables small
banks to overcome these financing problems often assumed to be relevant for other countries.
Our hypothesis is that the German interbank market provides some compensation mechanism:
even if small banks might see their deposits shrinking by more than large banks or might find
it more difficult to access other sources of finance, they will be able to access additional funds
on the interbank market. We will test this hypothesis in the subsequent section.
5 Monetary policy and interbank lending
5.1 The empirical models
In this section, the regression models are a slightly adjusted version of the ones in the
preceding section. The main macroeconomic variables - interest rates, inflation and industrial
production - are kept, whereas the bank loan variable is substituted for by various interbank
lending variables. The way we measure bank lending changes somewhat, however: We are
only interested in the net position of a bank on the interbank market, since for our purposes it
is not relevant whether a bank adjusts its interbank position by adjusting its liabilities or its
assets. Since the net position can be either positive or negative, it is not possible to take loga-
rithms of the data. This is not a serious drawback in our case, as the net position should be
fluctuating around a balanced position, i.e. around zero, so it cannot be subject to an expo-
nential path in the long run.
18 The nominal values can increase over time, however.
                                                                
18 Although it should be fluctuating around zero, the variables can deviate from zero for long periods of time. Therefore, they
need not be stationary – and indeed, they turn out to be I(1).– 13 –
The estimations are therefore performed in three ways. Firstly, the series of the asset and
liability volumes that were achieved with methodology (1) are used. Alternatively, those vol-
umes are used to construct ratios, i.e., the levels are scaled by total assets of the respective
group, the latter corrected for interbank liabilities. In a third variant, the series derived with
methodology (2) are used to ensure that the results are not driven by changes in the composi-
tion of the size classes. This sensitivity analysis is necessary and useful because in the sample
period studied, the German banking industry underwent significant changes due to merger
and acquisition activities.
19 We can, however, safely conclude that all three ways of measur-
ing interbank lending yield qualitatively equivalent results.
In order to enhance comparability across models, the monetary policy shock should be
identical in all models. Preliminary estimations showed that this can be achieved by keeping
one interbank variable in each of the different variants of the model. This provides an “an-
chor” that limits the deviations between the models to a minimum and creates basically iden-
tical responses of interest rates, inflation and industrial production across all different models.
The anchor that performs best in this respect is the net interbank position of the group of larg-
est banks in the internal interbank market. In the following, the VARs hence consist of
]' [ , 2 , 1 t t t t t t l l y r X π = , where  t l , 1  denotes this anchor variable, and  t l , 2  stands for vari-
ous alternative interbank variables that change from specification to specification and that
make it possible to test our hypothesis of a differential behaviour across size groups.
20
The cointegration analysis proceeds along the same lines as above. For most of the mod-
els, a cointegrating rank of four results (see table A3 in the appendix). In order to harmonise
the various regressions, this rank is maintained for all of the models. The cointegrating vec-
tors regarding the Bundesbank reaction function and real interest rates are restricted to be nu-
merically identical to the ones estimated in the preceding section in each of the models, again
to enhance comparability of the results. The other relations are allowed to vary, but relate the
interbank lending to interest rates, allowing for a time trend. The overidentifying restrictions
can never be rejected, as is shown in table A4 (see appendix). The estimated cointegration
relations of the interbank variables are provided in table A5 (also in the appendix).
                                                                
19 For a description, see e.g. Worms (2001).
20 The anchor is highly collinear with the internal bank lending variables of the other size classes. Nonetheless, the regressi-
ons yield practically identical results when estimating a model with both the anchor and another internal bank lending vari-
able or with one internal variable only.– 14 –
5.2 Segments of the interbank market
Figures A3 to A5 in the appendix show the impulse responses for the various interbank
lending models. The first row in each case depicts the responses of interest rates, inflation and
output to a monetary policy shock. Across all models these responses do not differ considera-
bly. Also, the price puzzle has disappeared from all specifications, and the surprising initial
output response remains in only one of them. This indicates that the VARs are generally well
specified.
The second row looks at lending of banks in the overall interbank market, separately for
all three size classes. Since the variables are defined as net asset positions, i.e. assets minus
liabilities, a negative reaction signals an increase in the net borrowing of a specific bank
group. The impulse responses show that banks of all size categories increase their net bor-
rowing following a monetary contraction. This might seem puzzling at first sight, since the
database comprises the full population of German banks. However, the German interbank
market is not a closed system, since banks can (and do, as will be shown below) access also
the international interbank market. So it seems as if all bank groups had a chance to cushion
the restrictive effect of monetary policy by financing their loans following a monetary policy
tightening via the interbank market. In the following, we will therefore look at different seg-
ments of interbank lending.
The third row of figures A3 to A5 contains the responses of the lending positions in the
external interbank market, i.e. excluding intra-sectoral balances. The responses of banks‘ po-
sitions are quite revealing. Small banks do not increase their borrowing in this market seg-
ment, whereas medium-sized and large banks attract additional finance through this channel.
These impulse responses are in line with the bank lending channel theory. If this were the
only source of interbank credit, small banks would face a deterioration of their financing
situation, and as such would be forced to restrict their bank lending by more than large banks.
The channel that distinguishes the German from the US banking system and that counter-
acts these distributional effects of monetary policy is analysed in row 4 of figures A3 to A5.
Here, we look at positions on the internal interbank market. It turns out that small banks raise
additional funds following a monetary tightening in this market segment. Actually, virtually
all of their borrowing in the overall interbank market is supplied through the intra-sectoral
links, as can be seen by comparing the magnitude of responses in rows 2 and 4. Similarly,
medium-sized banks borrow on the intra-sectoral segment, and get the bulk of their financing
needs from this source. On the other hand, the group of large banks, which includes all head– 15 –
institutions of both the savings banks´ and credit cooperative sectors, turns out to be a net
lender after the monetary contraction.
The last market segment that can be distinguished is bank lending from abroad. This ag-
gregate consists of all interbank positions of German banks with banks abroad, including for-
eign branches of German banks.
21 Here, again, the responses are in line with the assumptions
of bank lending theories – the results are compatible with the notion that small banks suffer
from informational disadvantages that prevent them from increasing their exposure to the in-
ternational interbank market. The most important players in this market are the largest banks,
which receive the main parts of their additional borrowing from abroad. The results are there-
fore consistent with the notion that after a restrictive monetary policy measure the group of
large banks borrows funds from abroad that are then channelled to the small and medium-
sized banks by the head institutions of the two bank sectors. This inflow of funds can of
course take different forms, either an increased borrowing or a withdrawal of deposits, either
at foreign banks or at the foreign branches of the German banks.
The results from this analysis are surprisingly clear, and furthermore robust to all three
ways of defining the interbank lending variables: the German system of intra-sectoral linkages
across banks tends to alleviate possible disadvantages of small banks on the interbank market.
By accessing the external interbank market through their head institutions, which themselves
belong to the group of large banks, small banks may overcome size related market frictions.
Whether this mechanism enables them to completely overcome possible disadvantages nev-
ertheless remains an open question. But, if this were the case, small banks that are organised
within one of the two sectors would not face a disproportionately strong drain of liabilities
following a monetary contraction compared to larger banks. But, we can at least say that co-
operative banks and savings banks should be more able to shelter their lending to non-banks
from interest rate shocks than are banks of similar size that do not belong to one of the two
sectors.
                                                                
21 On average over the sample period 1992-1998, around 55% of these interbank positions were denominated in DM. The
remaining positions are converted into DM at the current exchange rate. This leads to some ambiguity in the impulse respon-
ses: if an interest rate increase leads to an exchange rate appreciation, then this c.p. lowers the reported DM-value of the
interbank positions. In our estimations, we would therefore report a fall in the net position of German banks. However, we
consider the size of this bias likely to be smaller than the overall effect we observe. Firstly, because it concerns less than 50%
of the positions, and secondly because the magnitudes of the actual responses would be unreasonably large if they were
induced by exchange rate changes only: In figure A3, e.g., a 5 basis point interest rate increase lowers the net foreign inter-
bank positions by 0.8%. We would expect the exchange rate effect to be much smaller. Under the assumption that small
banks do not actively change their positions abroad, a rough guess of this magnitude could be found by the response of this
position, which is around 0.004%.– 16 –
5.3 The maturity structure in the interbank market
The data collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank are disaggregated according to the ma-
turity structure of interbank lending. We had imposed the identification assumption that a
monetary policy shock constitutes a transitory phenomenon for all included variables, an as-
sumption that would be supported if the interbank lending following such a shock were short
term in nature. To test this hypothesis, we decompose the interbank lending into short-term
(up to three months) and long-term lending (larger than three months), and repeat the analysis
for both maturity categories. Figures A6 and A7 (see appendix) give the according results,
confirming our hypothesis: Long-term lending does not seem to play any role in the reaction
to a monetary policy shock; virtually all the reaction takes place in the short-term maturities.
This is interesting mainly with respect to the intra-sectoral results. It is well known that, on
average, the intra-sectoral positions are a device for maturity transformations: “The savings
banks and credit cooperatives lend mostly short-term funds to the central institutions whereas
the latter, by contrast, return mainly longer-term deposits to the primary institutions.”
22 Al-
though this is certainly true in equilibrium, it is also the case that the central institutions act as
a provider of short-term funds in times of monetary contractions (or, as will be shown in the
next section, rather as an absorber of short-term funds in times of monetary easing).
5.4 The reaction of internal interbank market positions
As has been seen in section 5.2, it is the internal interbank market that performs a redis-
tributive task following a monetary policy shock. The groups of small and medium-sized
banks borrow funds after a tightening, which are supplied by the group of large banks. Since
the analysis had only considered net positions so far, we are not able to tell whether the
groups of smaller banks withdraw funds they had deposited with their head institutions, or
whether they take up new loans. Figure A8 in the appendix provides the impulse response
analysis of the gross positions on the internal interbank market. The groups of small and me-
dium-sized banks reduce their asset holdings on the internal interbank market, which is re-
flected in a reduction of the liabilities on the side of the group of large banks. Medium-sized
banks furthermore take up new loans; this reaction is quantitatively much less important than
the reduction of assets, and as such not reflected in a significant response of the asset side of
the group of large banks.
                                                                
22 Deutsche Bundesbank (2000), p.51.– 17 –
It can therefore be concluded that the savings banks and credit cooperatives deposit short-
term funds with their head institutions, when they have an ample supply of such funds (like
for example following a monetary easing) and that in times of shortages, these funds can be
withdrawn and flow back to the smaller banks.
Interestingly, the head institutions of the two sectors react to these outflows of funds by
adjusting their lending to non-banks accordingly. Following a monetary tightening, they face
an outflow of funds to the affiliated institutions, and consequently reduce their loans to non-
banks significantly. It turns out that the decrease of bank lending to non-banks for the group
of large banks (shown in figure A2) is mostly borne by the head institutions: separating the
response of the large banks into the head institutions and the other large banks, we find a sig-
nificant negative response of the head institutions, whereas that of the other large banks is
only insignificantly negative.
6 Loans from banks without intra-sectoral links
The preceding section has shown that the system of bank sectors can in principle serve as
a powerful tool for overcoming distributional effects of monetary policy across banks of dif-
ferent size. Logically, the question arises, whether the results obtained for the reaction of
loans to non-banks in section 4 will change if only banks without intra-sectoral links are con-
sidered. To investigate this, we have removed all banks from our sample that report non-zero
intra-sectoral positions. None of the remaining banks can access the internal interbank market
of the savings banks or credit cooperative sectors. We are left with only very few banks in the
group of small and medium-sized banks (in June 1995 only 91 out of 3665 banks), which are
quantitatively negligible (in June 1995 their market share in bank lending amounts to only
0.7%). The response of their loans to non-banks to a monetary contraction is shown in figure
A9 (see appendix), and compared to the response of loans by the largest banks (again, ex-
cluding all banks which are part of a sectoral system). Loans to non-banks from smaller banks
show no significant reaction instantaneously, but strongly decrease in the subsequent months.
This reaction is much more pronounced than that of the large banks, and additionally takes
much longer to return to baseline.
23 This is the size-related result usually obtained in empiri-
                                                                
23 Using the narrow loan aggregate (loans to private firms and to self-employed only), we find a similar decrease in the loans
of small and medium-sized banks, and no significant response of the loans of large banks. The t-tests show that the reaction
of bank lending is much stronger for the smaller bank groups, also for this loan aggregate.– 18 –
cal studies for other countries that have a banking system without some sort of internal inter-
bank market.
Due to the fact that both lending variables were included in the same model, it is possible
to apply simple t-tests on which reaction coefficient is stronger.
24 The following table presents
the results:
P e r i o d 0123456789
t-stat -1.34 0.71 1.99** 1.54* 1.37* 2.00** 1.68** 1.32** 1.23 1.08
** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level
We test a one-sided null hypothesis, namely that large banks react at least as strongly with
their lending to a monetary policy shock than does the group of small and medium-sized
banks ( sized medium small rge la H + ≥ θ θ : 0 , or, alternatively  0 : 0 ≥ − + sized medium small rge la H θ θ ). There-
fore, we can reject the null whenever the t-statistic exceeds the critical value of 1.65 (5% sig-
nificance level), or 1.28 (10% significance level). The test results are rather clear: For periods
2 to 7, we can reject the null. Only for the period in which the monetary policy shock occurs
can the opposite hypothesis be rejected. There is a clear support for a stronger reaction of
loans from small banks following a monetary policy contraction once all banks that belong to
a bank sector are removed from our sample. However, it has to be kept in mind that this is
only a very small fraction of all German banks and as such should not be of major concern to
policy makers.
7 Conclusions
This paper has provided an empirical analysis of how interbank lending reacts to a mone-
tary policy contraction. Using the bank balance sheet database of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
which covers all German banks, we have constructed size-sorted time series to test hypotheses
related to the bank lending channel theory. Several recent contributions have argued that a
meaningful test for the existence of such a bank lending channel can be performed by ana-
lysing the reaction of bank loans following a monetary policy shock: the loans of small banks,
it is claimed, should fall by more than those of relatively larger banks.
We have argued that, contrary to this reasoning, size in itself might not be a good proxy to
test for the bank lending channel in the German case. The majority of small German banks is
                                                                
24 We are reporting the tests for single time periods rather than the whole impulse responses, since the calculation of the latter
necessitates cumbersome calculations of the covariances for all periods and all variables.– 19 –
organised within either the savings banks’ sector or the credit cooperative sector. These sec-
tors seem to access the interbank market as a whole, with the large head institutions estab-
lishing the link between the external and the intra-sectoral interbank market. The reaction of
banks that are part of such a sector is therefore not only dependent on the characteristics of the
single bank, but also on the position of the sector on the external interbank market.
It has been shown that, following a monetary contraction, funds are channelled from the
head institutions of the two sectors to their affiliated small banks. Large banks on average
access the international interbank market to dampen the liquidity drain following a monetary
contraction, and then funds are redistributed through the internal interbank market of the two
sectors to smaller banks via the head institutions.
Small banks do not seem to play a major role on the external interbank market. Their only
source of additional funds is the internal interbank market. Neither the domestic external mar-
ket nor the international interbank market are accessed by the group of small banks.
We have furthermore shown that applying a size measure to test for the existence of a bank
lending channel is much more appropriate in the German case once all the banks that are or-
ganised in one of the two sectors are removed from the sample. In this case, the size of a bank
significantly affects the reaction of its loan volume to monetary policy impulses: loans to non-
banks from small banks decrease by more than those from large banks do. However, it has to
be noted that only very few small banks are outside the banking sectors and as such subject to
these distributional effects of monetary policy.– 20 –
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Appendix
A1: THE KPSW-APPROACH TO IDENTIFICATION IN STRUCTURAL VECTOR
AUTOREGRESSIONS
Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs) go back to the seminal article by Sims (1980).
They assume that the economy can be described by a dynamic, stochastic, linear model of the
form:
t t t k t k t t X L A X A X A X A µ µ + = + + + = − − − 1 1 1 0 ) ( ... , with µ µ t iid N ~( , ) 0 Σ (A1)
where  t X  represents an nx1-vector of endogenous variables, including one or several in-
strument variables, and L denotes the lag operator. The estimation proceeds with the reduced
form
XC X C X C L X tt k t k t t t =+ ++ = + −− − 11 1 ... ( ) ε ε , with CA A ii =
−
0




Estimates can be found for the coefficient matrices  i C  and the variance-covariance matrix
of the disturbances ε ε t,Σ . However, of interest are the parameters in the matrices  i A  and
Σ µ , which are exactly identified if n
2 parameters are restricted. A first set of restrictions is
found by the assumption of uncorrelated structural errors (i.e. Σ µ  diagonal) and by normalis-
ing the diagonal elements to unity, yielding Σ µ µ µ == EI tt n ( ' ) , which imposes nn () / + 12
restrictions. Hence, further nn () / − 12  restrictions are needed. Sims (1980) used a recursive
structure to achieve identification, whereas subsequent contributions extended the range of
identification schemes by restricting parameters in various matrices of the system. Amongst
these are KPSW (1991). They have shown that cointegration properties of the data can be
used for identification purposes. A cointegrated VAR model, which is in its Vector Error Cor-
rection format (Johansen 1995: 45-49):
∆Γ ∆ XX X tt i t i i
k
t =+ + −− =
−  αβ ε ' 1 1
1
,( A 3 )
has the Granger representation
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where A depends on initial values,  0 ' = A β , and C = ⊥⊥ ⊥
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. Equation (A4) shows that the representation in levels is composed of two
parts, the non-stationary common trends αε ⊥ =  ' i i
t
1  and the stationary part of CL t *( )ε .– 23 –
The idea behind KPSW is to decompose the shocks  t ε  into r  shocks that have only tran-
sitory effects (on the levels of the variables), and  r n−  shocks with permanent effects (with r
denoting the number of cointegration relations). This is achieved by rotating the system by















The matrix S  has to satisfy  0 ≠ SC . It follows that the new set of variables consists of
r n−  non-stationary and r  stationary variables. The stationary variables are identical to the
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⊥ ⊥ ⊥ (A6)
This system need not be identified fully; partial identification of either the transitory or the
persistent shocks is also possible. This amounts to the imposition of  ) ( r n r −  identification
restrictions by setting the according covariances of the shocks to zero. These restrictions have
been tested for by the test for the cointegrating rank. Instead, however, a different kind of
identification restriction is needed, namely a decision in which part of the system the sup-
posed shock is to be found (like in the context of the present paper, where the monetary policy
shock is identified in the transitory subsystem). This restriction cannot be tested and has to be
justified by economic theory.
To identify the subsystems, additional untested identification restrictions are necessary. If
only the shocks with permanent effects are of interest, then  2 / ) 1 )( ( − − − r n r n  additional
identification restrictions are needed. In particular, where there are  1 − = n r  cointegration
relations, no additional identification restrictions have to be imposed. Should the shocks of
interest be the transitory ones, then  2 / ) 1 ( − r r  additional restrictions are sufficient.– 24 –
A2: TEST STATISTICS
Table A1: L-max statistics for the test of cointegration rank
Total bank loans Bank loans small banks Bank loans large banks
a r 0 = 36.24 35.93 31.36
b r 1 = 17.90 29.60 18.33
c r 2 = 12.53 17.99 13.72
d r 3 = 5.49 10.77 6.65





Table  A2: Test for 3 cointegrating vectors: Bundesbank reaction function, trend-
stationary real interest rates, bank lending cointegrates with interest rates
and trend
Total bank loans Bank loans small banks Bank loans large banks
) 3 (
2 χ 7.66 5.95 2.91
p-val. 0.11 0.20 0.57
Table A3: L-max statistics for the test of cointegration rank,
(a) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
a r 0 = 38.74 43.01 39.28 39.45 39.02 39.28 37.97 42.09 42.09 35.50 34.08 37.52
b r 1 = 27.33 30.28 24.97 22.61 27.92 24.97 31.32 31.03 31.03 26.55 27.41 25.82
c r 2 = 23.84 20.86 20.46 17.44 20.6 20.46 25.18 20.16 20.16 16.61 19.76 18.78
d r 3 = 10.50 12.84 15.15 12.44 18.55 15.15 11.31 11.53 11.53 13.42 17.07 14.60
e r 4 = 8.03 6.13 7.68 7.05 8.70 7.68 8.18 7.86 7.86 6.46 5.13 6.74






(b) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), defined as ratios
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
a r 0 = 42.11 44.48 41.64 43.31 43.49 42.07 39.87 49.93 49.93 39.72 39.07 40.15
b r 1 = 29.38 26.93 32.11 22.10 25.39 31.25 33.96 29.50 29.50 26.27 29.67 33.54
c r 2 = 24.74 22.45 22.84 17.74 20.34 22.47 25.34 21.11 21.11 18.48 17.70 19.87
d r 3 = 10.65 11.95 15.75 12.62 14.38 15.74 10.32 10.35 10.35 12.47 17.26 15.75
e r 4 = 7.20 6.77 9.92 8.51 8.72 9.80 6.88 9.38 9.38 8.10 6.17 9.64






(c) interbank variables calculated with methodology (2)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
a r 0 = 42.11 44.48 41.64 43.31 43.49 42.07 39.78 49.93 49.93 39.72 39.07 40.15
b r 1 = 29.38 26.93 32.11 22.10 25.39 31.25 33.96 29.50 29.50 26.27 29.67 33.54
c r 2 = 24.74 22.45 22.84 17.74 20.34 22.47 25.34 21.11 21.11 18.48 17.70 19.87
d r 3 = 10.65 11.95 15.75 12.62 14.38 15.74 10.32 10.35 10.35 12.47 17.26 15.75
e r 4 = 7.20 6.77 9.92 8.51 8.72 9.80 6.88 9.38 9.38 8.10 6.17 9.64
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Table A4: Test for four cointegrating vectors: Bundesbank reaction function, trend-
stationary real interest rates, interbank lending variables cointegrate with
interest rates and trend
(a) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
) 4 (
2 χ 3.67 3.10 2.21 4.27 2.40 2.21 4.34 1.51 1.51 2.09 1.43 3.03
p-val. 0.45 0.54 0.70 0.37 0.66 0.70 0.36 0.82 0.82 0.72 0.84 0.55
(b) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), defined as ratios
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
) 4 (
2 χ 4.92 4.60 1.79 4.09 3.43 1.69 5.08 2.02 2.02 2.25 1.89 2.31
p-val. 0.30 0.33 0.77 0.39 0.49 0.79 0.28 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.76 0.68
(c) interbank variables calculated with methodology (2)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
) 4 (
2 χ 5.81 1.91 2.99 1.74 1.11 3.00 3.84 1.67 1.67 1.27 2.17 1.98
p-val. 0.21 0.75 0.56 0.78 0.89 0.56 0.43 0.80 0.80 0.87 0.70 0.74
Table  A5: The maintained cointegrating vector concerning the interbank lending
variable
(a) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
0.84 2.46 -0.60 0.21 1.12 0.82 0.71 1.12 -1.48 0.04 0.66 1.64
t r (0.06) (0.15) (0.35) (0.04) (0.05) (0.42) (0.05) (0.13) (0.14) (0.02) (0.05) (0.43)
-0.02 -0.02 -0.22 -0.01 0.01 -0.28 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.30 t
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04)
(b) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), defined as ratios
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
2.07 3.60 -0.29 0.31 1.20 0.26 1.76 1.26 -0.46 0.07 0.64 0.45
t r (0.15) (0.25) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08)
0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 t
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
(c) interbank variables calculated with methodology (2)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
1.13 2.02 -5.68 0.32 0.67 -4.05 0.65 1.28 -1.58 -0.02 -21.2 0.50
t r (0.08) (0.14) (0.43) (0.03) (0.04) (0.43) (0.05) (0.13) (0.14) (0.02) (3.78) (0.41)
0.01 -0.02 -0.38 0.00 -0.02 -0.43 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.68 -0.33 t
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.35) (0.04)– 26 –
A3: FIGURES




Interbank Market - Small Banks






Interbank Market - Medium Sized Banks






Interbank Market - Large Banks






External interbank market - Small Banks





External interbank market - Medium Sized Banks





External interbank market - Large Banks






Internal interbank market - Small Banks





Internal interbank market - Medium Sized Banks






Internal interbank market - Large Banks





Abroad - Small Banks





Abroad - Medium Sized Banks






Abroad - Large Banks






Figure A2:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on bank loans to the non-financial
sector lending; bank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Interest Rate
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Figure A3:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on interbank lending (by the vari-
ous bank size groups, from different segments of the interbank market);
interbank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Interbank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Interest Rate
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Figure A4:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on interbank lending (by the vari-
ous bank size groups, from different segments of the interbank market);
interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), defined in ratios
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), defined in ratios
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Figure A5:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on interbank lending (by the vari-
ous bank size groups, from different segments of the interbank market);
interbank variables calculated with methodology (2)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Interbank variables calculated with methodology (2)
Interest Rate
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Figure A6:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on long-term interbank lending
(by the various bank size groups, from different segments of the inter-
bank market); interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), de-
fined in ratios
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
long-term interbank variables
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Figure A7:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on short-term interbank lending
(by the various bank size groups, from different segments of the inter-
bank market); interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), de-
fined in ratios
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
short-term interbank variables
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Figure A8:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on the internal interbank market;
bank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
internal interbank market
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Figure A9:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on bank loans to the non-financial
sector by banks that are neither part of the savings bank sector nor of
the cooperative bank sector; bank variables calculated with methodology
(1)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Interest Rate
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A4: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: INCLUSION OF A LINEAR TREND IN THE REAL
INTEREST RATE COINTEGRATING VECTOR
Table A6: Test for overidentifying restrictions of the four cointegrating vectors, with
and without a linear trend in the vector on real interest rates; interbank
variables calculated with methodology (1), defined as ratios
(a) real interest rates trend-stationary
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
) 4 (
2 χ 4.92 4.60 1.79 4.09 3.43 1.69 5.08 2.02 2.02 2.25 1.89 2.31
p-val. 0.30 0.33 0.77 0.39 0.49 0.79 0.28 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.76 0.68
(b) real interest rates stationary
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
) 4 (
2 χ 7.83 12.37 7.61 11.62 11.59 7.74 7.77 8.40 8.40 11.23 10.18 7.95
p-val. 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.09
Figure A10:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on interbank lending, sensitivity
to the inclusion of a linear trend in the real interest rate cointegrating
vector
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
sensitivity wrt trend stationarity of real interest rates
Interest Rate
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